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Abstract
We investigate how bank migration across state lines over the last quarter century has
affected the size and covariance of business fluctuations within states.  Starting with a
two-state version of the unit banking model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we
conclude that the theoretical effect of integration on business cycle size is ambiguous,
as some shocks are dampened by integration, but others are amplified.  Empirically, we
find that integration diminishes employment growth fluctuations within states, and
decreases the deviations in employment growth across states.  Business cycles within
states become smaller with integration, in other words, but more alike.  Our results for
the United States bear on the financial convergence underway in Europe, where banks
remain highly fragmented across nations.
Keywords: Interstate banking, Business cycle, Financial integration
JEL classification: G21, E44, G281
Introduction
Banking in the United States was once highly disunited.  Instead of a few, very
large banks branched out across the states, we had essentially 50 separate banking
systems, one for every state.   Integration began in the late 1970s, as states began
opening their doors to out-of-state banks. Big bank holding companies marched in,
forming even bigger companies by merging and buying up other holding companies and
unit banks.  This integration has not only produced larger (but fewer) U.S. banks, as
many have noted, it has also transformed our fragmented banking industry of twenty-five
years ago into a much more nationally integrated, geographically diversified system
(Map).
What of it?  Why should bank integration warrant attention here?  Under
segregated banking, the fate of the state and its banks were closely tied; as went the
states, so went the banks.  Farm price deflation in the early 1980s bankrupted many
farmers and many farm banks, just as falling oil prices in the late 80s wiped out a lot of
Texans and Texas banks.   Falling prices may have precipitated these events, but the
associated financial distress—the deterioration in bank capital and borrower collateral in
particular--may have amplified the ultimate impact of the shocks, or so a large literature
maintains (Bernanke, Gertler et al).
This paper investigates how the integration of our banking system has altered
state business cycle dynamics, both within and across states.  To investigate the
theoretical effects, we add a second (physical) state to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) unit-
banking model.   By stylizing results from other models, they manage to incorporate the
firm collateral and bank capital shocks considered in isolation in other models.  Both2
shocks are contractionary with unit banking, not surprisingly, but the impact is
transmitted not just through falling investment demand but also via contracting bank
credit supply.  When we add the second state, we find that interstate banking dampens the
own-state effect of bank capital but amplifies the impact of firm collateral shocks.  As a
theoretical matter, we conclude that bank integration has an ambiguous affect on state
business volatility.
Our empirical findings suggest that the net effect of integration on state business
volatility is stabilizing.
1   State and year specific fluctuations in employment growth
diminish significantly as banks within the state commingle with out-of-state banks (via
holding companies).  The results are even stronger when we control for the composition
of employment within states, and when we instrument for integration using dummy
variables indicating the year each state entered an interstate banking agreement with one
or more other states.  Differences in growth across states tend to diminish with
integration, suggesting increased covariance of state business cycles.  We conclude that
state business cycles become smaller with integration, but more alike.
Our findings for the United States, where integration is far along, should be glad
tidings for Europe, where international bank integration is just commencing.  Judging
from their liability mix (Chart 1), European nation banks are still highly fragmented.
2
Applied there, our findings suggest that further bank integration in Europe will lead to
smaller, but more correlated, national business cycles.  More generally, our results may
                                                
1 Conceptually, there is more likely one shock that gets distributed to various parties by preexisting
contractual structure, bankruptcy arrangements, etc.
2 Except, of course, for the banking centers of Switzerland and the U.K. and the three “Benelux” nations.
Garcia Blandon (2001) finds that foreign bank entry in Europe is impeded by various non-regulatory
barriers, such as cultural distance between consumers, while export levels and the presence of
multinationals are positively correlated with foreign bank penetration.3
inform thinking about worldwide financial integration, since “globalization” is just a
scaled-up version of the natural integration studied here.
II. Integration and Volatility:  Some Literature
Capital and banking market integration have been considered in a variety of
contexts.  The international literature on capital market integration (across nations)
focuses mostly on the risk-sharing benefits of integration; cross-country diversification of
asset portfolios tends to smooth aggregate consumption within nations.   We doubt that
banking integration in the U.S. has important risk-sharing effects since capital (i.e., stock)
markets have been well-integrated across U.S. states for decades.  In fact, Asdrubali et al.
(1996) find that U.S. capital markets play a more vital role in income and consumption
smoothing across states than do credit markets.  The international literature does find,
however, that increased capital market integration may actually amplify the own-country
effect of productivity shocks as capital is able to flee a country afflicted with a
productivity slump.  Our model of interstate banking has some of that flavor.
Williamson (1989) compares the unit banking system in the U.S. to the more
integrated system in Canada.  Using an equilibrium costly monitoring model, he argues
that the cross-province banking in Canada should have stabilized the banking system
there relative to the unit banking system in the U.S.  His model also implies, somewhat
counter-intuitively, that integration amplifies the aggregate impact of aggregate real
shocks.  Integrated banking systems are less volatile, in other words, but the economy as
a whole becomes more volatile.
3  Our paper, by contrast, investigates how banking
                                                
3  The counterintuitive result that integration amplifies the effect of real shocks seems to stem from the
type of shock considered (a mean preserving increase in the projected technology risk) and on a hard-to-
explain effect of bank diversification on the elasticity of credit demanded by firms. His evidence from the
pre-War period is mixed.4
integration affects state volatility (rather than bank or aggregate volatility).  Our model
(below) is also quite different from his.
III. An Interstate Banking Model
We add a state to the (unit) banking model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and
explain how interstate banking alters the impact of various shocks.  As it turns out,
interstate banking is not necessarily stabilizing since some types of shocks get dampened,
but other types get amplified.
3.1 The Holmstrom and Tirole  Model
The HT model comprises three players:  firms, financial intermediaries, and investors.
All are risk neutral.  Firms have access to identical project technologies, but they differ in
their initial capital endowments:  0 A .  Financial intermediaries (“banks”) and investors
can both lend to firms, but only the banks have monitoring know-how; the uninformed
investors must rely on monitoring by the banks.  Investors have access to an alternative
investment opportunity.
Technology. Firms choose between a good project and either of two bad projects.
The “good” project succeeds with probability  H p ;  both “bad” projects succeed with
probability  L p .  A key parameter in the model is the good and bad projects’ relative
likelihood of success:  0 > - = D L H p p p .  All of the projects return  R per-unit
invested if they are successful and 0 if not.  R is public. The two bad projects also
produce differing amounts of private benefits (to the firm):  type b bad projects produce a
small private benefit (b);  type B bad projects produce a larger private benefit (B > b).
Moral Hazard and Monitoring.  Moral hazard arises because of the private
benefits from bad investments; firms may choose bad projects over good projects (with5
higher expected returns) because the former produce private (i.e., unshared) benefits.
Monitoring by a bank can prevent type B investment, but not type b investment.   The
idea here is that monitoring is an effective deterrent against obvious fraud and abuse
(e.g., simply absconding with the borrowed funds), but smaller abuses, (shirking, etc.)
must be remedied through incentive schemes.   Monitoring costs are proportional to the
amount invested; if investment is I, monitoring costs = cI.     Monitoring is itself a private
activity, in that savers cannot determine if bankers have actually monitored a given firm.
Private monitoring creates a second moral hazard; unless it is worthwhile, bankers will
only pretend to monitor.  Banks’ must invest enough of their own capital in the project to
ensure that they will monitor adequately.
4
Contracts. Firms will always choose a mix of liabilities, borrowing from both the
bank and investors.  If the project succeeds, the firm, bank monitor, and uninformed
investors receive  Rf, Rm and Ru percent of the return.  These shares are determined
endogenously, of course, by the opportunity costs of the three parties.  We prefer the
intermediation interpretation of financing structure offered by HT: investors deposit their
money with the bank; banks fund the firms they monitor with those deposits and the
bank’s own capital.  The bank’s ability to attract deposits depends on its own capital
(which is needed to assure uninformed investors that it will monitor firms adequately).
5
                                                
4 Project risk is not completely diversifiable so banks need a stake in the project (or else they would shirk
on monitoring).
5 Under the certification interpretation, uninformed investors invest directly in the firm, but only after the
monitor has taken a large enough financial interest in the firm that the investor can be assured that the firm
will behave diligently.6
Equilibrium and Comparative Statics.   Given the rates of return required by investors
(g ) and savers (b ), a firm with initial assets  0 A  chooses investment (I), its own capital
contribution (A), and its mix of liabilities to maximize its expected profits:
) ( ) ( max 0 0 A A Ru p Rm p RI p A U H H H - + - - = g subject to:
RI ‡ Rf +  Rm+  Ru    (1)
p bI Rf D ‡ /  (2)
p cI Rm D ‡ /  (3)
The main budget constraint (1) limits the sum of returns to the three parties to the
total return on the investment.
6  Eq. (2) is an incentive constraint; the gain in expected
payments to the firm from choosing the good project cannot be less than the private
benefit from choosing the first bad project.  Eq. (3) is an incentive constraint on the
intermediary; the expected gain in return to the bank from forcing the firm to choose the
good project must exceed the cost of monitoring, else the bank will not monitor.  In
equilibrium, all constraints will bind.
After solving the model, Holmstrom and Tirole show how shocks to each players’
capital affect the equilibrium returns to investors (g) and banks (b) and the rate of
investment by firms.   With just one state,  a reduction in savings supply (a savings
“squeeze”) increases g and decreasesb.  Intuitively, the changes in equilibrium returns
reflect the changes in the relative scarcity of the different forms of capital.  A decrease in
informed capital (a capital “crunch”) decreases g  and increases b .   A fall in firms’
                                                
6 The other budget constraints (i,ii,iii and iv HT p. 680)  are omitted here for brevity.7
capital (a collateral “squeeze”) decreases g  and decreases  b.  All three shocks have a
contractionary effect on firms’ investment spending.
3.2 Interstate Banking in the HT Model
We extend the HT model to interstate banking by simply adding another physical
state.  The only subtlety is in the treatment of capital mobility across states under the two
banking regimes (unit and interstate) that we want to compare.  For simplicity, we make
the extreme assumption that capital is completely immobile across states under unit
banking. In other words, unit banking is equivalent to the single state world HT
considered.  At the opposite extreme, we assume that capital is completely mobile across
states under interstate banking.  These extreme assumptions are not necessary for our
results below, however; we obtain qualitatively similar results so long as capital is
relatively less mobile under unit banking.
The appendix contains details on the extended model, the equilibrium, and the
comparative statics.  Table 1, below, compares the impact of the various capital shocks
under unit banking and interstate banking.  In short, the own-state effects of savings and
bank capital shocks are diminished under interstate banking because savings and bank
capital can flow from other states that did not experience a shock.  The own-state impact
of a firm collateral shock is amplified under interstate banking because banks in the
affected state are free to shift their lending across the border to firms with better
collateral.  Thus, the net effect of integration on volatility is ambiguous.  The following
propositions compare the impact of the three shocks under unit banking and interstate
banking.
Proposition 1:  interstate banking reduces the negative impact of a savings
squeeze in state 1 on the amount of investment in uninformed capital in state 1.8
Intuitively, the increase in g  necessary to compensate for the savings squeeze in state 1 is
smaller under interstate banking because uninformed capital can be attracted from state 2.
By mitigating the increase in g , cross-state capital flows reduce the impact of the shock
on creditworthy demand for uninformed capital.
Proposition 2: with interstate banking, the negative impact of an informed capital
crunch in state 1 on the amount of uninformed capital invested in that state is smaller than
with unit banking.  The intuition for this result (see Table 2) is that with interstate
banking, the increase in  b necessary to compensate the informed capital crunch in state
1 is smaller than with unit banking, since informed capital can be attracted from state 2.
This mitigates the increase in  b and its negative impact on the demand for uninformed
capital in state 1.
Proposition 3: with interstate banking, a collateral squeeze in state 1 has a
positive impact on the amount of uninformed capital invested in state 2.  Hence, the
amounts of uninformed capital invested in the two states move in opposite directions
following a state specific collateral shock.  The intuition for this result is that with
interstate banking, the drop in the creditworthy demand for uninformed capital implied
by the collateral squeeze in state 1 leads to a flight of uninformed and informed capital to
state 2, which decreases  b and g  in that state.  As a result, the creditworthy demand for
uninformed capital in state 2 increases.
In sum, cross-state banking amplifies the effects of local shocks to entrepreneurial
wealth (or, equivalently, productivity shocks) because capital chases the highest return.
Capital flows into the state when collateral (productivity) is high and out when it is low,
making the highs higher and the lows lower.  Integration dampens the impact of bank9
capital and  savings supply.  These sources of instability become less important because
entrepreneurs are less dependent on local sources of funding (banks and consumers) in an
integrated market since funds or bank capital can be imported from other states.
IV.  Empirical Strategy and Data
Identifying the separate shocks just discussed seems like an impossible task.
Even with the requisite data, the high correlation between bank capital and borrower
collateral would require incredible identifying assumptions.  Instead, we ask a more
tractable (but still useful) question: how has banking integration across states affected
overall volatility within states?  Do state-specific business fluctuations get bigger or
smaller as banks in that state become increasingly integrated with banks in other states?
We know from the model that if capital and savings shocks are a larger source of
volatility than collateral shocks, the net effect of integration should be stabilizing.
Integration, in other words, should reduce volatility.
Endogenous Integration?
Reverse causality of two sorts concerns us.  First, increased cross-state banking
may indicate merely that states’ economies are becoming more integrated; banks may
simply follow their customers across state lines.  If so, and if “real” integration affects
business volatility, our results may confuse the effects of state integration and bank
integration.  Reverse causality could arise also via banking “hangovers” (from too much
farming, or too much oil) as the associated distress and volatility may attract bargain-
hunting banks from other states.  To guard against these or other potential endogeneity
problems, we instrument for integration using an indicator for the year a state entered an
interstate banking agreement and the number of years elapsed since the agreement.10
A Brief History of Interstate Banking
Restrictions on interstate banking in the U.S. date back to the infamous Douglas
Amendment to the 1956 Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act.  With that amendment,
banks or holding companies headquartered in one state were prohibited from acquiring
banks in another state unless such acquisitions were permitted by the second state’s
government.  No states allowed such transactions in 1956, so the amendment effectively
barred interstate banking.  Change began in 1978, when Maine passed a law allowing
entry by out-of-state BHCs if, in return, banks from Maine were allowed to enter those
states.  No states reciprocated, however, so the integration process remained effectively
stalled until 1982, when the states of Alaska, Massachusetts, and New York passed laws
similar to Maine’s.
7  State deregulation was nearly complete by 1992, by which time all
states but Hawaii had passed similar laws.
8  The process was completed in 1994 with the
passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) that
mandated complete interstate banking as of 1997 and gave states the option to permit
interstate branching.
9
This roughly 15-year history provides an excellent experiment to see how the
resulting integration has affected volatility.  Luckily for us, the states did not deregulate
all at once, and the subsequent integration across states proceeded at different rates (Chart
2).  These staggered deregulatory events provide us with both cross-sectional and time
                                                
7 As part of the Garn-St Germain Act, federal legislators amended in 1982 the Bank Holding Company Act
to allow failed banks and thrifts to be acquired by any bank holding company, regardless of state laws (see,
e.g., Kroszner and Strahan, 1996).
8 State-level deregulation of restrictions on branching also occurred widely during the second half of the
1970s and during all of the 1980s.
9 IBBEA permitted states to opt out of interstate branching, but only Texas and Montana chose to do so.
Other states, however, limited entry by requiring entrants to buy their way into the market.11
series variation with which to identify the effects of integration; also, the deregulatory
events themselves provide a good instrument for integration.
Measuring Integration and Volatility
Bank integration equals the share of total state bank assets in a state that are
owned by banks affiliated with an out-of-state bank holding company.   To illustrate, if a
state had one unit bank and one affiliated bank of equal size, integration in that state
would equal ½.   We associate volatility with the year-to-year deviations (from average)
in various measures of business activity.   Starting with the annual growth rate of series x
for state i in year t, we first subtract off the mean growth rate in x for state i over time.
“Demeaning” by the state average accounts for long-run growth differences across states.
We then subtract off the mean growth rate of series x across states in year t.  Demeaning
by the national average each year helps control for aggregate business fluctuations.  Our
volatility measures will be the square of the resulting deviations, or the log of the squared
deviations.
The three series we demean in this way are the annual growth rates of total state
employment, small firm employment (N < 20), and commercial loans at banks.
Numbers on total employment are available from 1975-96 from the Census Bureau.
Small firm employment is available from the Bureau’s County Business Patterns starting
in 1977 (1978 after converting to growth rates).
 10  In principal, the more bank-dependent
firms in the latter category may be more affected by banking integration.  Commercial
                                                
10 From small firm employment, we remove the state-specific shock to employment that is common to both
small and large firms.  We do not use data beyond 1996 because banks began to operate across state lines
after that year.  This makes it impossible to estimate our integration variable. The small firm and total
employment data are not directly comparable as the former excludes self-employed individuals, employees
of private households, railroad employees, agricultural production employees, and most government12
loans include loans to businesses and commercial real estate loans.  These numbers are
available starting in 1985 on banks’ Call Reports.  For each state, we calculate the growth
rate of commercial business loans and commercial real estate loans made by all of the
banks headquartered in that state.  Banks do not have to report the state where the
borrower is located, so lending to out-of-state businesses and developers will be a source
of noise in the loan volatility series.  The late start of the series is also problematic, as the
big burst of interstate banking occurred between 1984 and 1987.  Our loan series begins,
in other words, at the beginning of the end of the fragmented era of the banking system.
While loan volatility seems like the natural place to look for evidence that integration
matters, the noisy and short series available to us will make the effects difficult to detect.
The integration and volatility measures are summarized in Table 2.  The mean
share of integrated bank assets over the full sample of state-years was 0.35.  Overall
employment grew 2 percent per year on average over the sample of state-years.
Employment growth volatility, as just defined, averaged 0.04%.   Small firm employment
growth was more than an order of magnitude less volatile than overall employment
growth, but of course, the sample periods are not the same.  Business loans grew over 7
percent per year on average (nominally), with average volatility of 1.6%.
VI.  Results
 In view of the ambiguous theoretical relationship between integration and
volatility, we choose to report a variety of relationships between the two variables.  For
each of the three measures of business volatility, we report both OLS and instrumental
variable estimates.  IV seemed advisable since the pace of integration may itself depend
                                                                                                                                                
employees. We drop Delaware and South Dakota as these two states’ banking sectors are dominated by
credit card banks due to their liberal usury laws.  See Jayaratne and Strahan, 1999 for details.13
on volatility.  As our instrument, we use a dummy variable equal to zero before a state
allowed interstate banking agreement, and one after.  We report results using the squared
deviation in each of the three business measures as a dependent variable (volatility), and
the log of the squared deviations (log volatility).  Logging seemed advisable to ensure our
results were not driven by outliers.  Since the employment volatility will obviously
depend on labor force compositions, we also control for the share of employment in each
one digit SIC sector (manufacturing, services, etc.) and employment concentration (the
sum of the squared shares).  We report results with and without the employment controls.
In all specifications we control for the year and state, so the resulting fixed effect
estimates reveal how increased integration within a state in a given year is related to
volatility within the same state and year. 
11
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficient estimates on the banking integration
variable for various specifications.  All but one of the estimates are negative, suggesting
that integration has, on net, a stabilizing influence on state business volatility.  The
coefficient is statistically significant in many cases, most especially for total employment
volatility (Panel A).  The IV coefficient estimates are considerably larger than the
corresponding OLS estimates, implying that the stabilizing influence of integration is
larger (if less precisely estimated) when we use the deregulation dummy variables to
parcel out the endogenous variation in integration.  Controlling for state’s labor force
                                                
11 But other important changes occurred during the 1980s, such as rapid adoption of sophisticated financial
models and increased use of securitization, not just for residential mortgages but also for consumer loans,
commercial real estate loans and even commercial and industrial loans (Mishkin and Strahan, 1999).  These
new technologies seem to have increased the efficient scale in banking and may be responsible, in part, for
greater integration. For an exhaustive review of the causes and consequences of financial consolidation in
the U.S., see Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999).14
composition also tends to increase the size and significance of the integration coefficient,
at least for the two employment volatility measures (Panels A and B).
The IV estimates (with employment controls) imply a substantial stabilizing
benefit from integrating bank assets across states.  The share of integrated bank assets
rose from 10 percent in 1975 to 60 percent in 1996, implying a reduction in state
employment growth volatility of .2 percent, a large number compared to mean
employment volatility over the sample (.04 percent)
The significance levels trail off as we move to narrower business activity
measures.   For business loans, the insignificance may be due to the short, noisy series we
have available.   Integration and volatility of small firm employment growth are
significant for half of the estimates.  The weaker results here are harder to explain, as the
data are better and we have more of it.
Integration and Convergence
If integration dampens idiosyncratic fluctuations in growth within states, as our
results suggest, we would expect the national or systematic component of state growth to
increase with integration.  As banks branch out across the nation, in other words, state
business fluctuations become smaller but more alike.  To investigate, we calculated the
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where x =  total state employment growth or employment growth at certain sized, smaller
firms.
12  This deviation measure for each state-year was regressed on the integration used
before; the share of state i bank assets in t held by non-state i bank holding companies.
All regressions included fixed effects (state and year), and if indicated, controls for state
employment composition and concentration.  Both OLS and IV coefficients were
estimated, where the instruments were the year of and years since a state entered an
interstate banking agreement.
Integration is associated with convergence in state business cycles toward the
national average (Table 4).   For total employment (Panel A), Integration enters every
specification with a negative and significant coefficient.  Controlling for state
employment composition and concentration makes the coefficient more negative,
sensibly, as differences in employment composition must certainly reflect the deviations
between state and national growth rates.
13  Also sensible is the large difference between
the IV and OLS estimates; the bias in the OLS estimates presumably reflects that states
with below average growth, and the banking problems attending such recessions, may
attract out-of-state bank buyers.   IV parcels out this endogenous component, hence the
larger coefficients.  Panels B and C show that the IV estimates are also significant when
we examine only deviations from average among smaller firms.  Note, however, that the
coefficients do not change monotonically as one might expect; the coefficient is larger for
firms with under 50 workers (panel C) than for firms with under 20 (Panel B), whereas
one might expect more convergence among the smaller, more bank dependent firms.
                                                
12 The sum goes to 49 because DE and SD are excluded (due of credit card banks) while DC is included.
13  Deviations from average growth were larger, for example, for states with larger than average
construction sectors, while those with large financial sectors were closer to average.   16
Perhaps we are asking too much of the data when we split it so finely.  We have found,
for example, that when we split the data at firms with more than 100 or more workers,
integration has no effect (to be added).  Broadly speaking, then, integration seems to
promote convergence only among smaller firms.
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. used to have essentially 50 banking systems, one in every state. With
deregulation over the last twenty-five years, we have moved toward a more integrated,
national banking system with holding companies operating banks in many different
states.  As a theoretical matter, the impact of cross-state banking on business volatility is
ambiguous, as integration immunizes borrowers from shocks to their own banks but
exposes them to shocks in other states.   Empirically, integration seems stabilizing on net;
employment growth fluctuations in a state diminish as its banks commingle with other
states’ banks.  The results are less significant with narrower measures, but the signs are
the same, suggesting that the fragmented U.S. banking system before the mid-1980s was,
in all likelihood, a source of state business volatility.   Integration also promotes
convergence across states; deviations in employment growth from the national average
tend to fall as integration increases.  State business cycles are becoming smaller, in other
words, but more alike.  As the French say:  the more things change, the more they stay
the same.17
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Appendix: Interstate Banking in the HT Model Equilibrium























The first term represents the firm’s own contribution, the second term represents the
demand for informed capital and the third term represents the demand for uninformed
capital.  Aggregating across firms (who all choose identical programs) yields the
economy-wide equilibrium.  Let  Kf  be the aggregate amount of firm capital,  Km the
aggregate amount of informed capital, and  Ku the aggregate supply of uninformed
capital. The first two are fixed, while the third is determined so that the demand for
informed capital equals the supply of uninformed capital  g g t s S + = ) ( . Let  ) (Ku g  be
the inverse supply function. The equilibrium in the market for uninformed capital
requires
(1)  ( ) Ku Ku p c b R Ku Km Kf pH ) ( / ) ( ) ( g = D + - + + .
The equilibrium rates of return in the two capital markets are
(2)  ( ) Ku p c b R K p Ku H / / ) ( ) ( D + - = g
(3) ) /( p Km cK pH D = b ,
where  Ku Km Kf K + + =  is the total amount of capital invested.
Now suppose there are two states.   Under unit banking (i.e., before interstate
banking was allowed), and assuming capital cannot move across states, the above
equilibrium holds in each state.  Interstate banking changes the equilibrium in two ways.
Assuming capital can move freely across states to equalize the return to uninformed
savers in the two states, there will be a single, aggregate (statewide) inverse supply of
uninformed capital
(i)  ) /( ) ( ) /( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 t t Ku Ku t t s s Ku Ku + + + + + - = g .19
Secondly, the shares  1 p  and (1- 1 p ) of aggregate informed capital Km1+Km2 invested in
each state adjust endogenously to equalize the return on informed capital across states.
Assuming complete capital immobility under unit banking and completely mobile capital
under interstate banking is extreme, of course.  All we really need for the results below is
that capital is more mobile under interstate banking than under unit banking, which seems
innocuous.
Equilibrium in the uninformed capital market under interstate banking requires
(4)  ( )( ) 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 ) , ( / ) ( ) ( Ku Ku Ku p c b R Ku Km Km Kf pH g p = D + - + + +
(5)  ( )( ) 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 ) , ( / ) ( ) )( 1 ( Ku Ku Ku p c b R Ku Km Km Kf pH g p = D + - + + - + .
The equilibrium rates of return are:
(6) ( ) ( ) 2 2 1 1 2 1 / / ) ( / / ) ( ) , ( Ku p c b R K p Ku p c b R K p Ku Ku H H D + - = D + - = g
(7) ( ) ( ) 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 )( 1 ( / ) ( / Km Km p cK p Km Km p cK p H H + - D = + D = p p b .
Proof of proposition 1:









D - D - + + D - + + D -














p s p R c b t p p R c b t p Km Kf p






1 1 s Ku
u ¶ ¶ is positive, since the positiveness of the payment promised to uninformed
investors,  0 ) / ) ( ( > D + - = p c b R K Rm , implies  0 ) ( > D + - - p R c b pH .
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under the symmetry conditions  2 1 Kf Kf = ,  2 1 Km Km = ,  2 1 t t =  and  1 s = 2 s  at initial
values.
Under the above mentioned symmetry conditions,  1 1 s Ku
u ¶ ¶ is twice as large as
1 1 s Ku
i ¶ ¶
Proof of proposition 2:
For the unit banking case, the derivative of  1 Ku  with respect to  1 Km  is
( )
2
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1 1 Km Ku
u ¶ ¶  is positive.
For the interstate banking case, the derivative of  1 Ku  with respect to  1 Km  is
( )
2
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under the above mentioned symmetry conditions.
1 1 Km Ku
u ¶ ¶ is twice as large as  1 1 Km Ku
i ¶ ¶ .
Proof of proposition 3:
For the unit banking case, the derivative of  1 Ku  with respect to  1 Kf  is
( )
2
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1 1 Kf Ku
u ¶ ¶  is positive.
For the interstate banking case, the derivative of  1 Ku  with respect to  1 Kf  is equal to21
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under the above mentioned symmetry conditions.  1 1 Kf Ku
i ¶ ¶  is positive.
The difference between the two derivatives is
14
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1 2 1 2 Kf Ku Kf Ku
u i ¶ ¶ - ¶ ¶ is positive.
                                                
14  Since we assume symmetry between the two states, 
1 2 1 2 Kf Ku Kf Ku
u i ¶ ¶ - ¶ ¶  is equivalent to
1 2 Kf Ku
i ¶ ¶ -  or 
2 1 Kf Ku
i ¶ ¶ - .  This provides a direct and convenient way for computing the









































































































































































































































































































































































s          Chart2: Cross-State Banking Waves






















Interstate banking agreements occurred in waves between 1982 and 1993.  States were grouped by the
year that they entered into an agreement.  Plotted for each wave is the median share of out-of-state
banking assets for states in each wave.
o:  1982-1984 wave
D:  1985-1987 wave
:  : 1988-1990 wave
  :  1991-1993 waveTable 1:  Savings, Capital, and Collateral Shocks Under Unit Banking and Interstate Banking
Panel A:  Savings squeeze in state 1
Unit banking: Interstate banking:
State 1 State 1 State 2
uninformed capital becomes scarcer
⇓
return on uninformed capital increases
⇓
decrease in the amount of uninformed
capital firms can attract
uninformed capital becomes scarcer in
state 1
⇓
upward pressure on the return on
uninformed capital in state 1
                                   ⇓
uninformed capital flows from state 2
⇓
return on uninformed capital in state 1
increases less than with UB
⇓
this mitigates the negative impact on the
amount of  uninformed capital firms can
attract in state 1
          ⇒
⇓
return on uninformed capital
increases in state 2
⇓
negative impact on the amount of
uninformed capital firms in state 2
can attract
Panel B:  Capital crunch in state 1
Unit banking: Interstate banking:
State 1 State 1 State 2
intermediary capital becomes scarcer
⇓
return on intermediary capital increases and
monitoring activity decreases
⇓
decrease in the amount of  uninformed capital firms
can attract
intermediary capital becomes
scarcer in state 1
⇓
upward pressure on the return on
intermediary capital in state 1
⇓
intermediary capital flows from
state 2
⇓
state 1 monitoring activity decreases
less than with UB
⇓
this mitigates the negative impact on
the amount of uninformed capital
firms can attract in state 1
           ⇒
⇓
monitoring activity decreases in
state 2
⇓
negative impact on the amount of
uninformed capital firms can attract
in state 2
Panel C:  Collateral squeeze in state 1
Unit banking: Interstate banking:
State 1 State 1 State 2
firm capital becomes scarcer
⇓
inward shift of the demand for uninformed
capital
⇓
returns on uninformed and intermediary
capital decrease
⇓
this mitigates the decrease in the quantity of
uninformed capital firms can attract
firm capital becomes scarcer in state 1
⇓
inward shift of the demand for uninformed
capital in state 1
⇓
downward pressure on the returns on
intermediary and uninformed capital in
state 1
⇓
capital flees to state 2
⇓
return on uninformed and intermediary
capital in state 1 decreases less than with
UB
⇓
larger decrease in the quantity of
uninformed capital that can be attracted by
firms in state 1 than with UB
⇒
⇓
returns on uninformed and
intermediary capital decrease  in
state 2
⇓
increase in the quantity of
uninformed capital that can be
attracted  by firms in state 2Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Integration 1078 0.351 0.281
A. Employment
Growth (annual) 1078 0.022 0.023
Volatility 1078 3.5e
-4 0.001
Log Volatility 1078 -9.683 2.440
B. Small Firm Employment
Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Growth (annual) 931 1.029 0.046
Volatility 931 0.002 0.018
Log Volatility 931 -9.858 2.334
C. Business Loan Growth
Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Growth (annual) 588 1.074 0.142
Volatility 588 0.016 0.054
Log Volatility 588 -5.941 2.212
Table 2
Bank Integration and Business Volatility Measures: Summary Statistics
Statistics calculated using number of state-year observations indicated.  Integration = share of bank assets in each
state held by banks affiliated with out-of-state bank holding companies.  Volatility of x is the deviation in the
annual growth rate of x from the mean for each state (across years) and mean across states (each year), where x =
total state employment, small firm employment, and commercial loans (business and real estate) by banks.Table 3
Cross-State Banking Integration and State Business Volatility Regression Coefficients
“Integration” = share of state i bank assets held by non-state i bank holding companies.  “Volatility” = squared
deviation in growth of business measure X from average X for each state and each year.  X = total state
employment (panel A), small firm employment (panel B), or business loans at banks (panel C).  Coefficients
estimated with state-year observations over 1975-96 (robust standard errors in parenthesis).  All models
include state and year fixed effects and, if indicated, controls for state employment composition (single digit
SIC sector shares) and concentration (sum of squared SIC sector shares).  Business volatility tends to diminish
as cross-state bank integration increases.
A.  Total Employment Growth
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
Volatility Log (Volatility) Volatility Log (Volatility)
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_ _ _ _
Observations
2 1078 1007 1078 1007 1078 1007 1078 1007
B.  Small Firm Employment (<19)
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
Volatility Log (Volatility) Volatility Log (Volatility)
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_ _ _ _
Observations
2 931 884 931 884 931 884 931 884
C.  Commercial Loans of Banks
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
Volatility Log (Volatility) Volatility Log (Volatility)
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_ _ _ _
Observations
2,3 588 576 588 576 588 576 588 576
*   significant at 5% level  ** significant at 1% level
1.  Controls: D.C. included.  DE and S.D. excluded due to presence of national credit card banks in those
states.
2.  Commercial Loan data available from 1985-1996.Table 4: Bank Integration and State Business Cycle Convergence
Reported are regression coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis).   Dependent variable equals absolute








it it x x | where x =  total state employment growth (panel A),  growth in employment at firms with
less than 20 employees (Panel B), and growth in employment at firms with less than 50 employees (panel C).
Primary independent variable, Integration, equals share of state i bank assets held by non-state i bank holding
companies.  Coefficients estimated with state-year observations over 1975-96.  All regressions include state
and year fixed effects.  If indicated, regressions also include share of employment in each SIC sector (single
digit) and the sum of squared shares.  Negative coefficient on integration indicates that deviations in state
employment growth fluctuations from national average fall as integration increases.
A.  Total Employment Growth
OLS Estimates IV Estimates











        Between








Observations 1078 1007 1078 1007
B.  Growth in Employment at Firms with Less than 20 Employees
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
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Observations 930 883 930 883
C.  Growth in Employment at Firms with Less than 50 Employees
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
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Observations 917 871 917 871
*significant at 5% level   ** significant at 1% level.
 Note:   D.C. included;  DE and S.D. excluded due to presence of national credit card banks in those states.